




rudolf von JhEring’s “strugglE for law” —  
thE rEJECtion of altErnativE forMs  
of disputE rEsolution?
1. JhEring’s two Main thEsEs with rEgard  
to thE “strugglE for law”
when rudolf von Jhering held his lecture entitled “the struggle for law” on 
11 March 1872 for the vienna society of Jurists, the wiener Juristische gesellschaft, 
he could not have known that it would become the most famous lecture ever given 
in the history of jurisprudence1. he was aware, however, of the fact that his state-
ments would break new ground. we even know, from a stenographer’s record of 
his words, that he spoke of experiencing “a certain degree of inhibition” at the 
beginning of his lecture2. after all, his theses did, in fact, constitute what was con-
sidered a breach of taboo — at least within the german-speaking juristic circles of 
the time. the fact that he did not invoke “incredulous smiles”3 or even cold rejec-
tion from his listeners, as he had feared, but rather enthusiastic approval and even 
* Dr. jur. Brunswick european Law school (BeLs), Institute for european and International economic Law, 
wolfenbüttel (germany).
1 E. Bucher: gegen jherings “jherings Kampf um’s recht”. was die Privatrechtler aus unsinniger These 
lernen können (in:) p. tercier et al. (ed.): “gauchs welt”. festschrift für Peter gauch zum 65. geburtstag, Zürich: 
schulthess 2004, p. 46: “the paper, less than one hundred pages long and pocket size, was a much greater public 
success than any other juristic publication before or since”. nor has any other juristic lecture been translated and 
continues to be translated to this day into as many languages worldwide (cf. e.g. seoul 1977, 2nd edition 1991; 
tbilisi 2000, Bogotá 2007).
2 r. von Jhering: Der Kampf um das recht. Vortrag des Hofrates Professor jhering. gehalten in der wiener 
juristischen gesellschaft am 11. märz 1872 (in:) h. klenner (ed.): Der Kampf ums recht, freiburg–Berlin: rudolf 
haufe 1992, p. 113.
3 Ibidem, p. 113.
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loud bravos during his lecture4, may be explained by the specific make-up of his 
audience. the people who had come together on 11 March 1872 at the vienna 
society of Jurists, an institution where juristic practitioners received further profes-
sional training, were not primarily academic tutors of jurisprudence. apart from 
certain well-known listeners such as Joseph unger, one of Jhering’s closest fa-
culty friends in vienna, the audience was made up of legal practitioners including 
solicitors, judges and officials as well as legal policy makers led by the Austrian 
Minister of Justice.
More than 20 years have passed now since herbert hofmeister pointed out that 
Jhering had at the time struck a chord with these practitioners by focussing on the 
enforcement of law, which the solicitors and judges present at the lecture had to deal 
with every day. the historical school of Jurisprudence, which had by then become 
predominant in austria too, had disparagingly treated the aspect of enforcement as 
a matter of course that was of no academic interest whatsoever6.
Jhering’s lecture centred on two main theses: firstly, the thesis that the struggle, 
or better the many major and minor struggles of plaintiffs in court for the enforce-
ment of their rights, needed to be recognised as more than just a mundane private 
affair (i will touch upon his own exceptions in due course) but that it in fact consti-
tuted “the great and sublime aspect of our ethical world order”, the implementation 
of the “notion of law” and of justice itself7. there is hardly a more idealistic height 
to which Jhering could have elevated the everyday court trial and with it both the 
plaintiff and the work pursued by the jurists involved. on the other hand, Jhering 
no longer saw the science of law as playing a fundamental role, despite the fact that 
it had been viewed as solely responsible for questions of the “notion” of law for 
centuries, both in the era of natural law and at the time of the historical school of 
Jurisprudence. in his view, it was clearly up to the state legislators to immediately 
eliminate any existing “imperfection[s] of the legal institutions” concerning the 
judicial enforcement of an individual’s own rights. otherwise, he warned, the “strug-
gle for law” would turn into a state-inflicted “struggle against law”8. this was 
Jhering’s first thesis which, it appears, for the first time concentrated the minds of 
legal theorists on what was taking place in the courts every day.
the second main thesis of the lecture did not refer to the implementation of 
law but a step before that, i.e. the creation of law. in a head-on attack against the 
then prevailing theory, put forth by friedrich Carl von savigny and georg friedrich 
puchta, concerning the creation of law, which set out that the “creation of law […] 
4 Ibidem, pp. 127, 130.
 h. hofmeister: jhering in wien (in:) Der Kampf ums recht. forschungsband aus anlaß des 100. Todestages 
von rudolf von jhering, Berlin: duncker & humblot 199, pp. 21–22.
6 Ibidem, p. 24.
7 r. von Jhering: Der Kampf um’s recht (in:) h. klenner (ed.): Der Kampf ums recht, op. cit., p. 7.
8 Ibidem, p. 69 (original emphasis).
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like that of language or art […] did not require a struggle, a fight or even a search”9, 
Jhering stated that, much like the implementation of the subjective rights in a trial, 
the creation of the objective law, i.e. the operative legal norms which formed the 
basis for any subjective right of the individual, required a “struggle” and more spe-
cifically a “struggle” between social antagonistic individual and group interests. He 
went on to state that, contrary to what the historical school of Jurisprudence had 
claimed since savigny and puchta, the constant development of law was not an 
expression of a “quietly operating force of truth” which, significantly, was reflected 
in non-state customary law rather than in state legislation, but that the exact opposite 
was true, that it was “the law, i.e. the deliberate […] acts of state power” which 
initiated and enforced “all intervening reforms” in the area of law10. however, since 
any changes to prevailing law threatened the interests of individuals, the creation of 
new laws regularly appeared to be the result of a legal policy “struggle”, “where, as 
with every struggle, it was not the reasoning that tipped the scales but the balance 
of power between the forces involved”. the result, according to Jhering, was that 
the content of a new law, much like in a “parallelogram of forces”, was often an 
expression of a “diversion from the original line to the diagonal”11. this was Jhering’s 
second thesis.
Both theses presented by Jhering in 1872 tied in with a thesis that he had first 
published shortly before that, in 1865, in the final volume of his first major work 
entitled geist des römischen rechts auf den verschiedenen stufen seiner entwicklung 
[the spirit of roman law at the various stages of its development]. it stated that the 
subjective rights of the individual were “interests under legal protection”12, no more 
or no less. as we all know, Jhering’s methodological and theoretical views would 
prevail over the coming decades not just in germany but also in many other countries, 
including the usa and in the 20th century led to the jurisprudence of interests. in 
fact, in view of american legal realism, Jhering was still hailed as one of the “god-
fathers”13 of american jurisprudence in the mid-20th century.
what is not as well known, however, is that Jhering’s thesis of the interest-based 
creation of law was not completely new in 1870s germany. ten years earlier, the 
young historian heinrich von treitschke had already spoken of the “thousand neces-
sary collisions of rights and interests”14. another ten years before that, in 180, the 
jurist and early sociologist Lorenz von Stein had identified the “interest […] of each 
9 Ibidem, p. 12.
10 Ibidem, pp. 12–13.
11 Ibidem, p. 14.
12 r. von Jhering: geist des römischen rechts auf den verschiedenen stufen seiner entwicklung, dritter theil, 
Erste abtheilung, leipzig: Breitkopf und härtel 186, § 60, p. 317 (original emphasis).
13 w. seagle: rudolf von jhering: or Law as a means to an end, university of Chicago law review 194–1946, 
vol. 13, iss. 1, p. 87.
14 h. von treitschke: Die freiheit (leipzig 1861) (in:) ausgewählte schriften von Heinrich von Treitschke. 
Erster Band, leipzig 1907, pp. 17–18.
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individual in relation to every other” as being the “principle of society”1. finally, 
in 186, the jurist and social historian wilhelm arnold went one step further, by 
seeing “many intersecting, conflicting and opposing interests in economic life”, 
which the legislative powers would need to “weigh up against each other, examine 
their greater or lesser justification and then make a decision”16. this was the same 
year in which Jhering, in the third volume of his major work The spirit of roman 
Law, for the first time combined the concept of subjective rights with the concept 
of interests. it was just a small step from arnold’s position to Jhering’s view of 
the law as an expression of a “parallelogram of forces” and interests, which in the 
early 20th century would be adopted almost verbatim by the founder of the jurispru-
dence of interests, philipp heck17.
the actual novelty in Jhering’s lecture on the “struggle for law”, in fact, lay 
elsewhere: on the one hand, in the first thesis about the moral and, as Jhering termed 
it, “socio-political”18 duty of each plaintiff to fight for his subjective rights in court 
as mentioned in the beginning19. on the other hand, Jhering’s view on the creation 
of law, about which he spoke publicly for the first time in 1872, constituted a break 
with tradition: here was an avowed student of the historical school of Jurisprudence, 
who had, in 1852, still dedicated his first major work The spirit of roman Law to 
the “great master georg friedrich puchta”20, i.e. to the other forefather besides 
friedrich Carl von savigny of the historical school of Jurisprudence, and this former 
student now looked upon the conflicting interests of individuals and individual social 
groups and saw them as a constructive force behind the contents of legal norms and 
even as a necessary precondition for legal reforms. this view stood in complete 
contrast to the Historical School of Jurisprudence, which saw such conflicting indi-
vidual and group interests as purely destructive forces that would lay waste to law. 
of course, the historical school of Jurisprudence acknowledged the fact that law 
developed over time, thereby making a legal reform necessary. in its view, how-
ever, such legal reform should not be initiated by conflicting interests but by the 
so-called Volksgeist, by the collective spirit and the general “needs” of the people, 
1 l. stein: geschichte der socialen Bewegung in frankreich von 1789 bis auf unsere Tage, Erster Band, 
leipzig 180, p. Xli (original emphasis).
16 w. arnold: cultur und rechtsleben, Berlin 186, pp. 117–118.
17 Philipp Heck as a young man, in his habilitation treatise, already spoke of the law as a “product of conflict-
ing forces” (p. heck: Das recht der großen Haverei, Berlin: Müller 1889, p. 91). Jhering’s equation of diagonal 
forces with a parallelogram would resurface in the 20th century at the core of heck’s explanation of the contrast 
between “conceptual jurisprudence” (Begriffsjurisprudenz) that was to be overcome and the “jurisprudence of 
interests” (Interessenjurisprudenz) which should be practised, when he labelled the law as “the resultant, a diago-
nal of conflicting forces, so to speak, whose impact is only apparent to us as a conflict of interests” (P. Heck: 
Begriffsbildung und Interessenjurisprudenz, tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (paul siebeck) 1932, p. 46).
18 r. von Jhering: Kampf…, op. cit., p. 6, on the phrase “do not tolerate injustice” and on the “socio-political 
— and notably not […] ethical — meaning” of the phrase.
19 r. von Jhering: Kampf…, op. cit., p. 27 (“duty to act against the common good”).
20 r. von Jhering: geist des römischen rechts auf den verschiedenen stufen seiner entwicklung, Erster theil, 
leipzig: Breitkopf und härtel 182, p. iii.
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i.e. of all members of a legal order rather than just certain individuals. Moreover, 
according to the historical school of Jurisprudence, the authoritative and specialist 
expertise to identify such collective “needs” with regard to legal questions in legal 
orders of advanced civilisations should not have been sought amongst state legisla-
tors but amongst the representatives of jurisprudence21.
however, Jhering’s theses on the “struggle for law” put an end to all of this. in 
his view, the populace no longer needed any self-appointed representatives who, 
under sublimation of the conflicting interests, which of course existed in reality, 
would always identify a single “need” which was purportedly common to all, no 
matter what question of law was being examined. Jhering envisaged a system in 
which this task was fulfilled by state legislators22 and the individual stakeholders 
concerned — today we would use the term lobbyists — who influence legislators 
in such a way that the resulting laws are in fact a reflection of a parallelogram of 
societal forces, to stay with Jhering’s choice of metaphor. whilst the advancement 
of this sociological manner of viewing the creation of laws as based on conflicting 
social interests is very familiar to us today, in the late 19th century it ultimately spelled 
the end of the historical school of Jurisprudence founded by savigny in 1814. this 
is — to sum up the first intermediary conclusion of my chapter — where one could 
see the significance of Jhering’s lecture on the “struggle for law” from the point of 
view of the history of legal theory.
2. altErnativE MEChanisMs of disputE rEsolution
we can, of course, now ask: do Jhering’s theses even allow the dispute resolu-
tions that occur every day when cases are settled out of court, by means of mediation 
or even by national and international courts of arbitration? is the “struggle for law” 
not in fact the exact opposite of the concept of arbitration as a substitute for litiga-
tion, in german “schlichten statt richten”23, which underpins the concept of arbitra-
tion, i.e. the settlement in private law of a dispute that is not based on conflict but 
21 on the contrast between “needs” and “interests”, not just terminologically, from the point of view of the 
historical school of Jurisprudence, which Jhering disagreed with, see C.E. Mecke: Begriff und system des rechts 
bei georg friedrich Puchta, göttingen: v&r unipress 2009, pp. 181–183, 210–212, 338.
22 r. von Jhering: geist des römischen rechts auf den verschiedenen stufen seiner entwicklung, Zweiter theil, 
Zweite abtheilung, leipzig: Breitkopf und härtel 188, § 38, p. 32, listed the “positive legislative powers” in this 
order: “law, customary law, autonomy of commerce”. however, in his “struggle for law”, he very clearly expressed 
the view that state legislation was the significant source of the law (R. von Jhering: Kampf…, op. cit., p. 13). he 
had already accused the historical school of Jurisprudence of having turned customary law into the “pet of current 
jurisprudence” maintaining that “it seems as if one felt obliged to compensate it for its previous neglect by bestow-
ing unconditional love” (r. von Jhering: geist des römischen rechts auf den verschiedenen stufen seiner entwick-
lung, Zweiter theil, Erste abtheilung, leipzig: Breitkopf und härtel 184, § 2, p. 2).
23 p. Collin: judging and conciliation — Differentiations and complementarities, Max planck institute for 
European legal history no. 2013-04, pp. –13.
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on cooperation and that leads towards a compromise? And finally: would Jhering, 
who was a proponent of the legal “struggle”, have even been aware of the concept 
of arbitration and recognised it as an alternative form of dispute resolution?
let us start with the last question. of course, Jhering was aware of the concept 
of arbitration. after all, this alternative form of dispute resolution which relies on 
an arbitrator who has been privately hired by both parties in the dispute has existed 
at least as long as the concept of conflict resolution in a state court. Roman law 
already made a distinction between a iudex, a judge, who ruled in disputes between 
two parties where one person’s word stood against the other’s, and an arbiter, an 
arbitrator, who, in contrast to the judge, was not bound by the rules of praetorian 
law and could thus use his discretion to negotiate a compromise between the two 
parties24. also the latter is occasionally mentioned in Jhering’s work2. Even his work 
The struggle for Law mentions church courts of arbitration in the late roman 
Christian period and Jewish courts of arbitration in the Middle ages as additions to 
state jurisdiction26. however, in this case Jhering sees arbitration as a consequence 
of a process of degeneration of the state in the sense that, according to Jhering, 
arbitration only gains importance in periods where the legal institutions of a state, 
and first and foremost the judiciary, no longer completely coincide with the “na-
tional sense of justice” (the “nationales rechtsgefühl”27).
arbitration did, in fact, experience an upswing in the areas of the church, the 
cities and the city guilds in the Middle ages, a period where a central state power in 
the sense of the modern concept of sovereignty was still lacking but where several 
partial legal systems co-existed in the same territories. nowadays, a similar pluralism 
in terms of the sources of law appears to be in the process of forming. the modern 
model of almost absolute internal and external state sovereignty, which had prevailed 
elsewhere for several centuries, did not establish itself fully and at national level 
until the founding of the german Empire in 1871. having dominated the entire 
20th century, it is now increasingly being questioned and challenged by a new legal 
pluralism28. this legal pluralism is based on privatisation, the decentralisation of 
public services and on the global communication between private stakeholders in the 
world economy and the internet, but also in international sports and non-commercial 
ngos29. it is, therefore, no coincidence that international arbitration, outside of tra-
24 a. schweppe: Das römische Privatrecht in seiner heutigen anwendung, Erster Band, Einleitung und allge-
meiner theil, göttingen: vandenhoeck und ruprecht 1828, § 122, pp. 262–263; k.-h. Ziegler: arbiter, arbitrator 
und amicabilis compositor, Zeitschrift der savigny-stiftung für rechtsgeschichte 84 (1967), pp. 377–379.
2 r. von Jhering: geist, Erster theil (182)…, § 12, pp. 19–161; r. von Jhering: geist, Zweiter theil, Zweite 
abtheilung (188)…, op. cit., p. Xv; r. von Jhering: geist, dritter theil, Erste abtheilung (186)…, op. cit., 
§ 2, pp. 72–73; § 4, p. 18.
26 r. von Jhering: Kampf…, op. cit., pp. 71, 12.
27 Ibidem, p. 12.
28 s. Meder: Doppelte Körper im recht, tübingen: Mohr siebeck 201, pp. 248–270.
29 s. Meder: Ius non scriptum — Traditionen privater rechtsetzung, tübingen: Mohr siebeck 2008, 
pp. 103–10.
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ditional commercial arbitration, is experiencing an unprecedented rise, chiefly in 
terms of the settlement of disputes between investors and the state, but also in the 
area of internet legislation, including the resolution of transnational trademark disputes 
arising from the allocation of internet addresses by the internet Corporation for 
assigned names and numbers (iCann). following the political decision to phase 
out the use of nuclear energy, the german government and public are currently wait-
ing with baited breath for the outcome of a claim for compensation, estimated at 
almost 5 billion euros, filed by the Swedish power company Vattenfall against Ger-
many at the international Centre for the settlement of investment disputes (iCsid) 
in new York, an international court of arbitration set up by the world Bank group. 
it is not just this dispute that raises, in principal, the question as to how a nation state 
is still able to preserve its political prerogatives against purely economic rationality.
3. how JhEring qualifiEd his thEsis  
on thE nECEssitY of a strugglE for law
so what is the link between the current global reality and Jhering’s “struggle 
for law”? My answer is this: there is none, perhaps, at first glance, but much more 
than one would expect at a second glance! At first glance, there is hardly a greater 
contrast than that between the anonymous world of globally linked private legal 
entities on the one hand, some of which have financial resources that would put any 
state budget to shame, and the pre-capitalist world conjured up by Jhering’s “strug-
gle for law” with a single creditor and an individual debtor made of flesh and blood, 
whose deliberate non-fulfilment of a contractual agreement under the law of obliga-
tions would offend the creditor’s honour and morally and ethically stir his blood to 
such a degree that he would feel not just legally but, indeed, morally bound to pur-
sue the debtor even if, as Jhering states, it meant his ruination. 
at second glance, however, the situation presents itself quite differently. 
a closer inspection of Jhering’s lecture clearly shows that he was by no means de-
manding the unconditional prosecution of debtors in order to maintain the creditors’ 
self-respect in all civil-law disputes and against all economic reason, or that he would 
have styled it as the “great national duty”30 of the creditors concerned — this, inci-
dentally, and i can only touch upon it here, would in fact constitute an anti-liberal 
aspect in Jhering’s legal thinking! it is important to note that Jhering actually de-
manded the unconditional prosecution of the debtors only in cases where the latter 
disputed the existence of the debt against their own better judgment31. in all other 
30 r. von Jhering: Kampf…, op. cit., p. 7.
31 quite clearly, Jhering had his work-shy maidservant in mind here. see the interesting contribution in this 
volume by inge kroppenberg and nikolaus linder who have analysed the extant court records pertaining to the 
peculiar legal dispute between one of the most renowned jurists of his time and his maidservant. the latter was 
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cases, where the debtors had a valid reason to believe that they were wrongfully 
pursued, the economic interest of the creditor alone was the decisive aspect, even 
according to Jhering. Jhering specifically says:
“Towards the bona fide [sic!] possessor of my chattel, I stand in a very differ-
ent situation. here the question is what i have to do. it is not a question of my feel-
ing of legal right, of my character, of my personality, but a pure [sic!] question of 
interest; for i have nothing here at stake but the value of my chattel, and therefore 
i am entirely warranted in weighing the gain and stake, and the possibility of 
a doubtful outcome, one against the other and then make my decision: to sue, abstain 
from suing, or settle. settlement [scil. in court] […] with the premises which i pro-
pose here, is the best means of resolving the dispute”32.
unfortunately, these crucial words uttered by Jhering are still being overlooked, 
even by established exponents of jurisprudence, which results in Jhering’s famous 
paper in fact being reduced to nothing more than a “misguided thesis”33.
in Jhering’s view, the basic evil of his time was that no difference was made 
between two types of cases, i.e. between cases where a debtor denied the debt he 
owed to his creditor against his own better judgment and “in a shameless fashion”34 
and the other cases, where both the creditor and the debtor were convinced of mak-
ing a rightful claim, and where one or the other had to be disabused of this notion 
by the final judgement of the court3. unfortunately, he himself intentionally refrained 
from pointing out that these other cases were not the exception, even in his time, 
but constituted the vast majority of civil-law disputes. despite Jhering’s teaching on 
the struggle for law, this again opened up the possibility for the creditor who was 
faced with the question of whether or not to sue the debtor to rationally weigh up 
all the advantages and disadvantages of a trial and potentially even to seek a settle-
ment in or out of court as “the most appropriate solution”36 to the legal dispute. in 
these cases, Jhering was very clearly opposed to a “struggle for law” at all costs, to 
an “insistence on being right”, a “litigiousness”, a pathological “sense of justice” 
and even to an “aberration of the sense of ownership” on the part of the creditor37.
represented by a very capable lawyer who made Jhering look rather poor as an advocate acting on his own behalf. 
Jhering’s feelings of justice not having been served in court may have additionally fuelled his emotions, which are 
still noticeable in his lecture.
32 r. von Jhering: Kampf…, op. cit., pp. 29–30.
33 a recent example of this being E. Bucher’s paper, the subheading of which uses these very words: 
E. Bucher: gegen jherings…, op. cit., pp. 46, 48. Contrary to Jhering’s own words, Bucher in fact accuses him of 
promoting the struggle simply for the sake of the struggle. This accusation, however, is not justified. See, chapter 4 
of this paper for a summary of the elements in Jhering’s paper which were, in fact, of their time and not without 
flaw.
34 r. von Jhering: Kampf…, op. cit., p. 93.
3 Ibidem, p. 93.
36 Ibidem, p. 30.
37 Ibidem, pp. 31–32. after his paper had been published, Jhering felt compelled to add a footnote at this point 
(ibidem, p. 18, no. 49): “the above passage should have guarded me from the accusation that i promoted the 
struggle for law without taking into account the conflict that prompted it. Only where a person is trampled underfoot 
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a second point, however, is also worth mentioning. By 1872, the worlds of 
Berlin and vienna were no longer as pre-capitalist as Jhering and his audience, whose 
thundering applause was recorded by the stenographer, would have apparently liked 
them to be. Jhering’s lecture can, in fact, be read as a protest speech against the 
“sludge of the stock market game and […] shareholder fraud”38. in the burgeoning 
heavy and transport industries and on the complementary capital market, even at 
that early stage, an individual’s personality and character, a person’s sense of justice 
and injustice, in short: the man of flesh and blood became expendable. Jhering was 
not the only member of the educated middle-class to find this abhorrent and to voice 
his aversion to the “stark, naked materialism in the nether regions of egoism and of 
scheming”, along with a longing for an “idealism”, “where all sophistication and 
calculation” have come to an end39. in this he has found allies in all subsequent crit-
ics of unbridled capitalism including, incidentally, those who are currently taking 
to the streets and protesting against free-trade agreements such as the ttip (trans-
atlantic trade and investment partnership) and the international arbitration envisaged 
as part of it.
does this mean that Jhering, if he was alive today, would align himself with 
those law professors who prepare legal opinions on the lack of democracy and 
transparency in free-trade agreements on behalf of transnational anti-globalisation 
organisations such as attaC? of course, the question cannot be answered due to 
its deliberately unhistorical speculativeness. what can be said with certainty, in 
citation of legal historical sources and later statements on legal policy, however, is 
that Jhering on the one hand saw the inherent danger in the “omnipotence of the 
state”40 and its destruction of an individual’s civil liberties, whilst at the same time 
being ahead of his time by viewing as dangerous the “excessive accumulation” of 
capital in the hands of a few, which gives “such a significant predominance to the 
producer over the ordinary man” in a system where individual “talent and personal 
earning capacity […] are completely powerless against such wealth”41. we also 
know, from the “conversation in old age” (altersgespräch) with his son hermann 
in 1887, that Jhering saw the “latifundial system”, as he called it, of the big East- 
-Elbian landowners in the east of the german Empire as posing a major social 
problem, which in his opinion would even have justified massive infringements of 
in his rights have i declared the vindication of one’s rights to be a vindication of one’s self, and thus a matter of 
honour and moral duty. when this difference, on which i have laid so much stress, is overlooked, and the absurd 
view is attributed to me that quarrel and dispute are beautiful, and that litigiousness and dogmatism are virtues, 
I can find no other explanation than to assume either ‘dishonesty’ on the part of the reader or ‘negligence in read-
ing’”. However, this clarification did not help Jhering’s cause as far as some fellow experts are concerned (see, 
footnote 33).
38 r. von Jhering: Kampf…, op. cit., p. 40.
39 Ibidem, pp. 43, 4.
40 r. von Jhering: geist, Zweiter theil, Erste abtheilung (184)…, op. cit., § 30, p. 131.
41 Ibidem, § 31, p. 16; § 34, p. 246 footnote 369; § 34, p. 2.
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the freedom of ownership, for instance by [quote] limiting the “maximum sizes […] 
of […] the huge estates owned by individuals”42.
of course, we do not know how Jhering would have judged the Vattenfall 
vs. germany case that is currently pending before the international court of arbitration 
in new York. however, presumably Jhering would have come to the same conclusion 
as the german federal Constitutional Court did in its ruling on the appeal made by 
vattenfall in germany in parallel to the claim before the new York court of arbitration. 
the headnotes of the ruling of december 2016 state: “under certain circumstances” 
there is “a justified trust” on the part of the foreign investor in the “legal position 
underpinning the investment in assets and their operationality”, in this case the nu-
clear plants and the fact that their ownership is protected by the constitution, though 
this ownership protection cannot be seen as absolute vis-à-vis the political preroga-
tives43. after all, Jhering did not intend to make a case for “the insatiability of egotism” 
in the name of the “sanctity of ownership”, as Jhering termed it in his second, unfin-
ished major work Law as a means to an end”, in german Der Zweck im recht44. i am 
therefore quite sure that he would have expected the international court of arbitration 
in new York to make a ruling that was as differentiated and legally comprehensible 
and — in contrast to common courts of arbitration practice4 — as transparent for the 
public as the ruling issued by the german federal Constitutional Court.
4. Era-spECifiC issuEs and wEaknEssEs  
of JhEring’s thEsEs
it is not possible to do justice to Jhering’s lecture and paper “the struggle for 
law” if it is not treated as a product of its time and viewed from Jhering’s personal 
point of view. He also displayed a lifelong tendency towards a very specific type of 
rigorousness in the service of justice. as a young man, he was exposed to criticism 
from his colleagues because he believed that someone who wished to “promote 
a principle” must wish to pursue it ruthlessly and without regard for oneself or 
others, whilst accepting all consequences of the principle, even if the results in an 
actual law case were shown to be absurd or unjust46. when he realised, as a middle-
42 h. von Jhering: erinnerungen an rudolf von jhering (1912) (in:) h. Ehrenberg (ed.): rudolf von jhering in 
Briefen an seine freunde. mit zwei Bildnissen, reprinted leipzig edition of 1913, aalen: scientia 1971, p. 47.
43 federal Constitutional Court of the german federal republic, Judgement of the first senate of 6 december 
2016, paragraph 1 Bvr 2821/11, headnote 6 (http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20161206_1bvr282111.html).
44 r. von Jhering: Der Zweck im recht, Erster Band, leipzig: Breitkopf und härtel 1877, p. 20 (original 
emphasis).
4 the parallelisation of peoples and individuals can be found as early as the 18th century, for instance in Johann 
gottfried herder’s thinking.
46 C.-E. Mecke: objektivität in recht und rechtswissenschaft bei g.f. Puchta und r. v. jhering, archives for 
philosophy of law and social philosophy 94 (2008), p. 16–166.
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-aged man, that this had been misguided and went on to denounce it as “conceptual 
jurisprudence” (Begriffsjurisprudenz), he sought and found a new area upon which 
to exert his rigorousness for the sake of justice, namely the struggle not for insight 
but for the enforcement of law. as he had been wont to do in his youth, he once 
again saw his “idealism” as a “question of character”. according to Jhering, not all 
but certain disputes could, in the eyes of certain individuals, turn from being “a mere 
question of interest to a question of character”47, which required a “struggle” using 
legal means. 
Most importantly, however, Jhering was a child of his time and he uttered 
thoughts and used words that seem slightly strange to our ears today. Even the word 
“struggle”48 had not yet become historically charged but Jhering and his contempo-
raries would have viewed it as an expression of the modern view of real life in nature49 
and in society. another factor is the parallelisation of peoples and individuals0, 
which, while not devised by Jhering1, was restricted in a pseudo-naturalistic system 
of thought by himself and some of his contemporaries at the end of the 19th century. 
from there it was only a short step to issuing a warning against the “exposure of 
law” by the individual to the “life of a people; all peoples are on their own, no 
higher power will take on the struggle for a people’s rights”2. however, such era- 
-specific marginal statements have no impact on the two main theses of Jhering’s 
lecture. the “struggle” in his lecture is a struggle for a person’s rights using legal 
means, or in Jhering’s own words: “[…] the struggle for one’s rights [always] equates 
to a struggle for the law […]”3.
47 r. von Jhering: Kampf…, op. cit., pp. 26, 74.
48 the entire paper contains a rhetoric that appears misguided from today’s point of view, but would have been 
part of the common mindscape and parlance amongst the men of his generation, not only in germany but all over 
Europe. see, r. von Jhering: Kampf…, op. cit., p. 54 (“flees”, “treachery”, “defend”), pp. 56–57 (“the battle against 
the enemy from without”, “the battle against the enemy from within”, “cowardly flight as a betrayal of the com-
monwealth”), p. 117 (“flight in battle”), p. 129 (“the duty of cowardice as scientifically expressed”), to name but 
a few examples.
49 C. darwin: on the origin of species by means of natural selection: or the Preservation of favoured races 
in the struggle for Life, london: Murray 189. at the time of Jhering’s lecture, darwin’s “struggle for life” had 
already become a general topic of discussion. it is quite possible that Jhering was even inspired by darwin’s work 
when he chose the title of his lecture, a work which, at a time when no categorical distinction was yet made between 
the natural sciences and the humanities, spelled a sea change in the history of scientific research overall. And yet, 
we may not view darwin’s work as holding the key to Jhering’s legal thinking, which, despite his very obviously 
held belief in the forces of nature and mechanics, was still, even at the end of his life, rooted in the Christian 
manifestation of god (r. von Jhering: Ueber die entstehung des rechtsgefühles, revidierte und mit einigen text-
kritischen anmerkungen und Verweisungen versehene wiedergabe des Vortragsprotokolls vom 12.03.1884 (in:) 
o. Behrends (ed.): rudolf von jhering. Über die entstehung des rechtsgefühles mit einer Vorbemerkung und einem 
anschliessenden Interpretations- und einordnungsversuch von okko Behrends, napoli: Jovene 1986, pp. 12, 4.
0 r. von Jhering: Kampf…, op. cit., pp. 10, 24–2, 104.
1 Ibidem, p. 62.
2 Ibidem, p. 43.
3 Ibidem, p. 62.
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Christoph-EriC MECkE
rudolf von JhEring’s “strugglE for law” —  
thE rEJECtion of altErnativE forMs  
of disputE rEsolution?
s u m m a r y
rudolf von Jhering’s famous lecture entitled “the struggle for law” which, since its 
first publication in 1872, has counted among the most frequently translated papers in juris-
prudence ever, contains two main theses. one is devoted to explaining the creation of law. 
in contrast to friedrich Carl von savigny, the founder of the historical school of Jurispru-
dence, Jhering ascribed the creation of the legal order of his time to the state legislator when 
viewed from the perspective of the sources of law and to whichever individual or group 
interests emerged victorious from power-political struggles when viewed from the perspec-
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tive of its content. with this thesis, Jhering drew on a view that was beginning to emerge in 
the mid-19th century society which, in a manner that pointed to the future, saw the source of 
law as being rooted in the struggle for power of different interest groups within society. 
Jhering’s second main thesis transferred this view onto the process of the application of law 
in court. he maintained that since all dictates of justice, as resulting from this struggle for 
power, were nothing more or less than interests with legal protection and since the law only 
became real when it was actually applied, a person fighting for their legal right in court was 
not only fighting for their own right but also for the law in general and thus for justice. 
however, according to Jhering, the creditor’s duty to society to rigorously enforce their 
claim against the debtor, albeit not by force but exclusively by legal means, only applied in 
cases where the rights of the creditor and, therefore, the legal order as a whole were spe-
cifically questioned by the debtor because he denied the claim against his own better judge-
ment. By making this important qualification of his second main thesis, Jhering acknowledged 
that in certain specific cases the creditor could indeed have legitimate reasons, for instance 
of a moral or economic nature, to decide not to insist on enforcing his rightful legal claim 
against the debtor. 
therefore, modern mechanisms of dispute resolution such as arbitration, which Jhering 
would have been familiar with based on his knowledge of the roman arbiter, or mediation, 
are not contradictory to Jhering’s theses on the “struggle for law”. however, like many of 
his contemporaries who praised the theses of his lecture, Jhering, in his idealising and 
moralising the pre-capitalist view of the enforcement of law, was solely focused on the 
personal relationship between the creditor and the debtor, and not on legal disputes in 
the anonymous world of publicly traded companies which were already beginning to emerge 
in Jhering’s lifetime in the western European heavy and transport industries.
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